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Account privacy and erasure

Privacy cases, legal holds, subject exports, anonymisation and purge for accounts, plus the privacy repository registry, retention policies, metrics and completion evidence.

Overview

This is a reference page for Accounts. It covers the compliance workflow for privacy requests and what the platform retains. The lifecycle states these cases produce are summarised in Accounts → Lifecycle and retained data.

Privacy cases, holds, and subject exports

Open Admin → Users & Security → Privacy Operations at /admin/settings/privacy-operations. The cases table shows reference, type, status, due date and next step, with Overdue and Waiting for queue badges where applicable. Search by reference, filter by type or status, and page through the results. An account filter can be cleared above the table. Links to /accounts/privacy-operations redirect here and keep their account filter.

If a case leaves the current filtered view while a dialog is open, the dialog closes and a warning explains that the case is no longer available.

Choose Open a privacy case (or press n) to select the account and enter the request in a dialog. Each row offers Verify identity and Approve and run or Retry when applicable; those actions open dialogs too. View case shows the case timeline, active holds, adapter status, retained exceptions and available evidence downloads. Use Relationship → Governance on an account to inspect its visible privacy standing. The catalogue item, REST and MCP surfaces expose subject access, restriction, erasure and anonymisation. Purge retains its eligibility route; retention review remains system-opened. Hold placement/release and lawful-basis assignment are separate operations.

Opening and verifying require accounts.view and accounts.privacy.case. Approval also requires accounts.privacy.export for subject access or accounts.privacy.anonymise for erasure/anonymisation. Subject access follows the tenant's privacy_export high-risk policy: recent password confirmation and independently authenticated approval may be required. Entering another user's ID alone does not supply that approval. The existing erasure/anonymisation action does not apply this export policy. Anonymisation requires the displayed account version; reload after a conflict.

The default deadline is one calendar month after the request timestamp, clamped at month end. An explicit due date overrides it. Overdue cases remain visible. A self-hosted case approved more than fifteen minutes ago shows a worker hint: ensure a worker consumes privacy and inspect Queue in System Health. Approval queues the existing tenant-stamped job; there is no separate unguarded run endpoint.

The workflow is:

  1. Open a case with the account, case type, jurisdiction (normally GB), request basis, reason and deadline. The action resolves merged aliases into one subject set; subsequent endpoints use the returned canonical account ID.
  2. Verify the subject identity.
  3. Assign a lawful basis and repository-specific retention policy.
  4. Add a legal or operational hold when a disposition must be stopped.
  5. Approve the case with the permission required for its outcome.
  6. Let the bounded worker process the version-pinned repository inventory. Failed repositories retry; missing or changed required adapters block completion. Correct the cause and select Retry, or call the approve endpoint again for a failed or blocked case. Completed cases have no mutation controls.
  7. Review the signed completion receipt and any retained exceptions. Subject-access cases also produce private, encrypted JSON and HTML artifacts. They expire after seven days by default and support audited download, revocation, and pruning. Pruning removes expired or revoked artifact rows, encrypted objects and export chunks together. An active hold preserves them. If row deletion rolls back after an object was removed, rollback compensation restores the encrypted object for retry; this does not claim recovery from an abrupt process termination.

Completion receipts list the approved registry, canonical and alias IDs, repository counts and dispositions, registered legal bases, retained exceptions, hold scope and disposition codes, actor IDs and UTC times. Configured high-risk approvals retain their policy mode and independently authenticated approver/request IDs. Private request and hold prose, export records and arbitrary adapter payloads are excluded. Recovered execution failures retain coded attempt evidence marked recovered; unresolved failures and blocked repositories cannot receive a signed completion receipt. The signed receipt remains immutable and a completed-case replay cannot create another one.

Restriction, anonymisation, erasure, and purge of the tenant owner require ownership transfer first. Staff-linked identities are processed through the authentication adapter so restriction revokes sessions, API tokens, password-reset state, invitations, magic links, and OAuth access. The direct anonymise API always refuses: mutable identities return privacy_case_required, while prior binding, authorization, version, staff, hold and lifecycle guards retain their exact refusals. It neither anonymises the identity nor creates an idempotency receipt. Use the approved privacy-case workflow and inspect each registered repository’s actual outcome; a completed identity-repository outcome does not prove whole-system erasure. Staff-linked identities require the authentication adapter.

A legal hold declares which dispositions must be blocked across the canonical account and aliases. Approval and lifecycle checks must respect it; do not infer full worker/concurrency enforcement from the hold record alone. Releasing a hold requires accounts.privacy.hold and a recorded reason. A hold does not delete the case or its evidence.

Hold scope and blocked dispositions are separate controls. At the private merge-snapshot execution boundary, identity and all_subject_data holds block pseudonymisation. A legal_records hold permits removing only the private resolution_log keys source_values, canonical_values, and resolved_values; public merge provenance, receipt hashes, aliases, and retained legal facts remain unchanged. This repository-specific permission does not bypass whole-subject approval: any active hold that blocks erasure or anonymisation still refuses that approval across the canonical account and aliases.

Restriction follows the hold's explicit blocked dispositions. The default destructive list does not include restrict, so a restriction case may proceed under any of the three scopes while the hold remains active and private merge snapshots remain retained. An explicit restrict entry refuses restriction approval. These rules describe the installed boundary; concurrent hold admission and all-repository residue still require their own evidence.

Contact response replay copies

The privacy contact adapter also removes private fields from persisted email, phone, address and link DTO replay copies identified by their stable typed <family>:<id> references. Phone numbers, postal address/coordinates and link URL/name fields receive the same treatment as email addresses. Null fields and contact IDs/classification metadata remain intact, and unrelated contact DTOs remain unchanged. The replay receipt remains completed with its original status, key, fingerprints and contact ID; replay returns [REDACTED] for removed private fields and cannot execute the original mutation again. A late response or operator reconciliation applies the same treatment when that typed contact source no longer exists. Before removal, the original contact DTO remains available for the configured replay TTL; scheduled model pruning physically deletes expired response rows.

The identity adapter also redacts an erased account’s own name, reference number, description and private profile identifiers in typed account DTO replay copies. Stable account IDs/references and financial result fields remain intact. Stored responses change in the same identity transaction; late persistence and reconciliation lock the account first and consult its completed destructive identity execution. Restriction alone retains the necessary identity copy.

This applies to the typed account and contact data returned by these endpoints. Responses without a stable reference, unrelated response families and arbitrary caller-supplied key contents are not covered.

Account request logging

Account-scoped API metering records retain source IDs, request/response sizes and counters but omit request and response bodies, including buffered records. Other resources retain their explicitly configured body-capture policy. Malformed buffered payload diagnostics retain a digest and byte count rather than the raw payload; successful diagnostic publication is still required before acknowledgement.

Privacy operations metrics

Privacy metrics use the account.operations.metrics log message with schema_version: 1 and an event name. The table lists the emitted dimensions, excluding those two envelope fields. Adapter rows have affected_record_count on success and error_code on failure; those dimensions are alternatives, not a requirement for both on every row.

Event Dimensions Meaning
privacy.case.created request_age_seconds, status Request age at creation; future request times clamp to zero.
privacy.case.verified status, verification_seconds Time from request to identity verification, or null if verification time is absent.
privacy.case.approved approval_seconds, policy_mode, status Time from request to approval, or null if approval time is absent. Policy is permission or two_person; inspect status because preflight can leave the case blocked.
privacy.hold.placed hold_count, status Active holds after placement.
privacy.hold.released hold_count, policy_mode, status Active holds after release, with the authorization policy.
privacy.adapter affected_record_count, attempt, duration_ms, error_code, retry_count, status, store_key One execution-attempt result. Retry count is attempt minus one; duration is a non-negative float in milliseconds, rounded to three decimal places. A fifth failure has no next attempt.
privacy.case.failed error_code, status Case-level registry-version block or missing complete subject-access artifact, including failures with no failing adapter.
privacy.case.completed approval_seconds, download_count, hold_count, request_age_seconds, retained_exception_count, sla_seconds, status, verification_seconds Completion age, request-based verification and approval times, active holds, retained exceptions and SLA budget.
privacy.artifact.downloaded download_count, policy_mode, status One authorized download; count is 1 and status is downloaded.
privacy.artifact.revoked status Artifact revocation, with status revoked.
privacy.artifact.pruned expired_artifact_count Number actually deleted, including revoked and expired artifacts; a no-op run emits zero.

Approval time is measured from requested_at to approved_at, not from verification. sla_seconds is the requested_at-to-due_at budget, not elapsed completion time. A null due_at produces null sla_seconds; no breach flag is emitted. Compare completion request_age_seconds with a non-null sla_seconds: equality meets the budget; a greater age breaches it. Completion download_count is 0; later downloads use privacy.artifact.downloaded.

Active hold counts include only unreleased holds whose effective time has arrived and whose expiry is null or in the future. Future-effective and already expired holds do not count. Retained exceptions describe the signed receipt's retained outcomes, not proof of complete erasure. Read the original failures, retry attempts and repository evidence alongside completion.

case_type is dropped by the schema version 1 allowlist. The metric context excludes account, case, hold and artifact IDs, actor IDs, references, free text, contact details, subject lists, artifact paths or hashes, adapter payloads, outcomes and checkpoints. Repository keys and error codes use bounded lowercase codes; invalid or overlong labels become redacted. Ambient logging context is neither copied into the metric nor mutated.

Hold, download, revocation, case-failure and completion callbacks emit after commit, so a rolled-back transaction contributes no callback metric. These records do not confirm external side effects. account.privacy.retry_dispatch is a plain log with dispatched_count, not a metric event. Its count reports selected due jobs, not completed cases.

The read-only account health privacy block reports open cases (all except completed and revoked), overdue non-terminal cases with due_at strictly before now, active holds, failed or blocked adapter executions, downloaded artifacts, and unrevoked artifacts expiring at or before now. Case-level failures are observed through privacy.case.failed; the failed-or-blocked-adapter count concerns execution rows. Pruning changes the artifact counts only when rows are actually deleted. Health counts contain no identifiers and do not replace the per-repository evidence or native concurrency checks.

documents.response_recorded_by_user_id is a nullable staff user identifier for a customer decision recorded by staff. The document API and document webhook DTOs expose it separately from the customer name. It is included in the account subject-reference inventory and native document audit profile; deleting the staff user clears the live foreign key while preserving the recorded customer decision. External webhook recipients may retain already delivered identifiers.

New account audit rows retain changed-field names, identifiers, coded decisions, versions and timestamps, with copied private values redacted. Account webhook delivery logs omit receiver response bodies and repository minimised payloads; diagnostic failures retain the exception class rather than its message, bindings or trace. Authorized account DTO fields remain available to their webhook recipient, whose permissions are checked again when the queued delivery runs. Retained audit snapshots are not copied into new webhook envelopes.

Existing account audit rows without the minimised-payload version remain restricted evidence. Reading their snapshots requires both action-log.view and accounts.privacy.case; ordinary API and audit timeline queries exclude them. Generic age-based pruning preserves these rows for the existing repository-specific retention review, lawful basis and approved schedule. This restriction neither rewrites historical bytes nor establishes a universal retention period.

The case workflow, explicit adapters, export artifacts, holds and signed receipts do not on their own guarantee complete PII erasure. In particular, the generic ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter reports zero affected records for retain, restrict and pseudonymise dispositions, with a retained exception. A policy label such as pseudonymous_subject_key, least_privilege or no_marketing does not by itself minimise retained fields or enforce that restriction in every reader. Explicit adapters have their own bounded behaviour; evaluate each repository rather than treating registration as completed erasure.

Financial, legal, audit and privacy records may need retention. Retention must identify the applicable jurisdiction, lawful basis, your approved schedule, minimum necessary fields, access and reuse restrictions, and an expiry or review date. The current GB legal-repository policy names source_record_retention_schedule without a fixed statutory duration. Signals does not set a universal retention period or legal policy for you. A missing schedule is not permission to delete legal facts or invent a deadline.

Complete erasure across every repository, including derived, external and backup copies, is not yet guaranteed. Do not restore erased PII from history, exports, caches, indexes or backups, or rewrite immutable money or event facts to make a receipt look complete.

Retained legal evidence means the specific records and fields identified by each case's repository outcomes and signed receipt. It is not a blanket exemption for account contact details, free text or every copy of a record. The installed policies distinguish the following retained material:

Material Purpose and limits Retention rule
Financial and transaction facts: invoice and credit records, payments, allocations, tax, purchasing and rental facts, including declared financial reasons and notes Accounting obligations, under legal_obligation; subject fields follow the repository's pseudonymisation rules. Legal-record restrictions include least_privilege, no_marketing and pseudonymous_subject_key. The configured source_record_retention_schedule. The core GB policy supplies no fixed number of days.
Issued document numbers, rendered data, PDF/HTML snapshots, currency and issue dates Preserve issued legal documents. Mutable drafts are erased where supported; retained snapshots have access credentials revoked and remain identified in the case outcome. The configured source_record_retention_schedule; no fixed duration is supplied by the core document policy.
Audit and event facts, workflow and approval evidence, privacy cases and signed receipts, and import/export activity metadata Accountability and legal claims, under accountability_and_legal_claims, with least_privilege and no_operational_reuse. Declared private event values are redacted; identifiers, money, dates and event ordering remain. A retained evidence record is distinct from an export file. The configured restricted_evidence_schedule. The core evidence policy supplies no universal expiry. Ordinary Action Log pruning uses action-log.retention_months (default 12 months); restricted account audit snapshots are excluded from that generic pruning and require their separate retention review.
AI embedding consent evidence: owner ID, acceptance and revocation timestamps, cleanup timestamp, provider, mode, trust class, purpose, policy version and configuration hash Operator accountability for the owner's consent. The explicit consent locator retains these records and excludes them from an account subject export; its outcome does not claim erasure or authorise retaining account content. Classified under platform.potential_data, whose rule is configured_operational_retention_or_no_configured_expiry, with review required. No fixed consent-evidence duration is configured by the core privacy policy.
Backup copies and encrypted restore tombstones Security and disaster recovery; backup content is excluded from live subject exports. Retained copies require isolation from live processing and tombstone reapplication when restored. backup_rotation_and_tombstone_reapplication, following the configured backup policy; the privacy policy supplies no fixed rotation period.

Subject-access export artifacts have a separate, short access lifetime: privacy.subject_access_artifact_days defaults to 7 days. Expiry refuses download; the pruning job removes eligible files subject to applicable holds. This access lifetime does not set the retention period for financial records or privacy completion evidence. Destructive embedding policy separately declares within_24_hours with expires_after_days set to 1; that rule does not authorise retention of other repositories.

Operators must configure and approve the jurisdiction-specific source-record and restricted-evidence schedules, consent-evidence retention, their expiry or review dates, and backup rotation, then verify enforcement for each repository. These schedules have no fixed core duration and remain an operational follow-up; a completed case or a retained-exception flag does not supply the missing policy.

Privacy repository registry

The required registry is versioned and fail closed. It covers these repositories:

  • Account identity, contact points, relationships, extended data, preferences, and history projections.
  • Authentication identity and credentials.
  • Rentals, finance, assets and purchasing, documents, communications, workflows, approvals, audit, and privacy evidence.
  • Import/export artifacts, search index, OpenAI embeddings, and derived caches.
  • Webhook deliveries, VAT responses, backups, external processor handoffs, and admitted plugin data.

Each repository declares an adapter version, policy version, disposition, legal basis, expiry rule and processing restrictions. The processor blocks missing required adapters, policy/inventory mismatches and incomplete repository executions. A complete set of registry results does not guarantee exhaustive subject coverage or enforced retained-data restrictions.

Published repository keys and policy fields

CoreAccountPrivacyStores requires these 26 keys; contributed repositories must also satisfy the registered owner and reference-manifest coverage checks:

Repository group Required keys
Account and authentication accounts.identity, accounts.contacts_relationships, accounts.extended_data, accounts.history_projection, accounts.preferences, auth.identity
Operations and legal records rentals.operations, finance.legal_records, assets.purchasing, documents.records
Communications and evidence communications.conversations, communications.notifications, workflows.evidence, approvals.evidence, catalogue.evidence, audit.evidence, privacy.evidence
Derived and transferred data imports_exports.artifacts, search.index, search.embeddings, cache.derived, webhooks.deliveries, tax.vat_responses
Recovery and contributors backups.restore, processors.handoffs, plugins.data

Registry schema version 1 identifies its content as privacy-stores-v1-<digest>. The digest includes reference classification, required keys, adapter definitions and policies. A case pins this inventory; missing adapters, policies or changed versions must be investigated rather than waived.

Current core defaults use jurisdiction GB for each case type. Privacy evidence uses policy version 2; other core records use version 1. Policy fields are store_key, policy_version, jurisdiction, case_type, disposition, legal_basis, expiry_rule, expires_after_days, review_required and processing_restrictions. Legal basis labels include data_subject_access, legal_obligation, accountability_and_legal_claims, security_and_disaster_recovery and verified_case_authority; these are recorded policy inputs, not legal advice or proof of an approved lawful basis.

The installed rules distinguish these dispositions by repository and case type:

Disposition Installed GB example
erase accounts.identity for an erasure case.
anonymise accounts.identity for an anonymisation case.
pseudonymise finance.legal_records for an erasure case.
restrict accounts.identity for a restriction case.
retain accounts.identity for a retention-review case.

Jurisdiction lookup trims and uppercases the supplied code. Unsupported jurisdictions have no GB fallback. A separately registered policy is isolated by repository, jurisdiction and case type; it must not be treated as permission to reuse another jurisdiction's rule. Symbolic expiry rules and null durations do not establish an approved statutory retention period.

Legal, evidence, processor and backup repositories require review and name source_record_retention_schedule, restricted_evidence_schedule, processor_contract_deadline and backup_rotation_and_tombstone_reapplication respectively. Most default periods are null; destructive embedding policy alone declares within_24_hours and one day. Confirm the owner-approved jurisdiction-specific schedule and actual enforcement before relying on any deadline. Restrictions such as no_marketing, no_operational_reuse, no_rebuild_after_erasure and processor_deletion_receipt_required remain policy declarations until their consumer or processor evidence is checked.

Retained-exception emitters

The following installed adapters can set the literal retained_exception flag. A flag identifies a retained outcome, not a count of physical residue or proof that the original PII remains. The completion metric counts flagged repository descriptors separately from independently sampled row and file occurrences. A policy or backup flag with no sampled PII is a conservative zero-match exception; it must not be presented as observed residue. Other registered adapters currently do not emit this flag, even when their outcomes describe retained records; this list does not certify their minimisation or completeness.

Repository key Adapter When the flag can be true
assets.purchasing ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter Non-export retained, restricted or pseudonymous legal records.
audit.evidence ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter Non-export retained or restricted evidence, including pseudonymous audit outcomes.
auth.identity AccountAuthIdentityPrivacyStoreAdapter Pseudonymised staff identity retains membership evidence; the flag does not require a matching staff row.
backups.restore AccountBackupPrivacyStoreAdapter Every outcome, including export excluding live backup content and restore-tombstone recording. Backup bytes are not sampled or rewritten by the adapter.
catalogue.evidence ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter Non-export retained or restricted evidence.
communications.conversations AccountConversationPrivacyStoreAdapter A non-export outcome has a positive conversation/comment record count.
communications.notifications AccountCommunicationPrivacyStoreAdapter The outcome has a positive delivered-communication count.
documents.records AccountDocumentPrivacyStoreAdapter Retention/restriction has a positive record count, or pseudonymisation retains legal snapshots.
finance.legal_records ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter Non-export retained, restricted or pseudonymous legal records, with retained instances where applicable.
privacy.evidence ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter Non-export retained or restricted evidence, including private merge-snapshot redaction that preserves legal provenance.
rentals.operations ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter Non-export retained or restricted records, including pseudonymous subject fields and retained legal facts.
webhooks.deliveries AccountWebhookPrivacyStoreAdapter A positive matched record count, including export; this flag does not prove remote deletion.
workflows.evidence ManifestAccountPrivacyStoreAdapter Non-export retained or restricted evidence.

The processor can separately mark any repository's blocked-by-hold outcome as a retained exception. That is a refusal before adapter execution, not another adapter emitter or a completed-erasure certificate.

The signed descriptor's legal basis and restrictions are policy inputs. Compare them with the actual retained records and your approved schedule; neither a flag nor its absence grants retention authority or establishes erasure.

AccountPrivacyCaseSampler::sample($limit, $afterCaseId) provides a manual read-only review window for operators with both accounts.view and accounts.privacy.case, checked on every call. It selects completed cases by ID (default 20, maximum 50); pass next_case_id to continue and restart without a cursor after the final window. Results contain case IDs and coded counts for signed receipt integrity and binding, current registry/repository coverage and adapter drift, expired or revoked export objects, and holds effective at completion, including later releases. Current purge or lifecycle holds distinguish retained export objects; an absent object does not establish when it was removed. Receipt and child-read bounds and unavailable artifact repositories produce invalid or unassessable counts. Generic residual-identifier checks are always unassessable by recorded disposition: retained or empty reference counts cannot establish clean erasure. The sampler changes no case, file, job or audit state and installs no unattended schedule; periodic automation remains pending a named actor contract, and these checks do not establish whole privacy acceptance.

Hold and subject-request procedure

An authorised operator places a hold with accounts.privacy.hold against a non-terminal case, recording authority, reason, blocked dispositions and the canonical subject/alias scope. Record effective time and any review or expiry time; review and expiry must follow the effective time. Default blocked dispositions are destructive outcomes. Keep the case blocked while a relevant hold remains and separately verify worker enforcement.

Release uses the same ability, configured high-risk authorisation (including a second approver where required) and a non-blank recorded reason. After current authorisation passes, releasing an already released hold is a no-op. A consumed two-person approval cannot be reused, even for a repeat release; that refusal leaves the hold, case, approval evidence, and repository executions unchanged. When the last relevant active hold is released, a blocked case returns to draft if identity is unverified or verified if identity was already checked; release does not itself approve or complete erasure.

For subject access, verify identity and authority before approval, inspect the pinned repository inventory and retained exceptions, then permit audited download of the encrypted private artifact only for a completed subject-access case. Revoked or expired artifacts refuse download. For anonymisation, erasure or purge, check holds, ownership transfer and outcome permissions, inspect each execution and residue evidence, and preserve retained legal facts. The direct anonymise contract API refuses without mutation; use the approved case workflow described above.

Backup posture and completion evidence

Event history is pseudonymised on erasure, not deleted. Declared personal fields in stored events and state snapshots are replaced directly under the subject locks: null where accepted end to end, or [redacted] where a projection or state invariant requires text. Other event facts, including identifiers, money, dates and ordering, stay unchanged. The table receipt lists changed payload keys, idempotent repeats and shared-subject retention. Financial evidence, including allocation reasons and payment notes with matching refund reasons, is retained under the accounting-records basis and listed as financial_record.

New event metadata does not contain IP addresses or user agents. The originating live request still supplies these to action_logs under its existing twelve-month retention and read-time redaction; replay and repair leave them null. Existing event metadata retains its original values. Backup copies retain original personal values until they expire on rotation, not on request.

AccountBackupPrivacyStoreAdapter excludes backup content from the live subject export. Destructive cases record an encrypted restore tombstone tied to case, subject and registry version and report a retained exception. The adapter does not rewrite backup bytes or implement restore admission. Operators must separately verify backup rotation, restore isolation and tombstone reapplication before ordinary processing; the restore_reapplies_tombstones label is not proof that a restore pipeline does so.

Completion requires all required executions to be completed; blocked and failed executions remain incomplete, and subject access requires an artifact. The approved execution keys must match the current registry both before claiming work and before signing completion. A missing or unexpected key blocks the case with privacy_store_execution_set_incomplete; reapproval rebuilds the execution plan while preserving completed records for the same registry version. The signed receipt records repository key, adapter and policy versions, disposition, legal basis, execution status, matched/affected counts, attempts, outcome, active holds and retained exceptions. HMAC verification authenticates the stored receipt; it does not prove exhaustive erasure, minimisation or lawful retained-data access. Review actual adapter results, source residue, derived copies, processor deletion receipts and restore evidence. Preserve original failures and retries alongside completion evidence; a complete receipt cannot turn an unproven repository into a verified compliance outcome.

Approval evidence and import/export activity metadata can remain after a destructive case under accountability_and_legal_claims, with least_privilege and no_operational_reuse restrictions. Their version 2 adapters mark nonempty retained evidence explicitly in the signed receipt. Import/export record_count counts matched evidence records; revoked-file counts remain separate from that retained-data count. Subject-access export does not mark these live records as retained exceptions.

Cloud delivery evidence

The platform privacy inventory validates Conductor login and delivery records as retained tenant operational telemetry. The locator records retained row identities and does not export them as subject data or claim their erasure. Unclassified payloads block completion rather than being silently accepted. Retention still needs an approved operational schedule.